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This paper investigates the role of property rights in environmental decisions and choices regarding the distribution of income in a downstream water pollution problem. The results conﬁrm that who owns the property
rights is a signiﬁcant determinant of these decisions. More speciﬁcally, under certain conditions a property rights
owner who suﬀers the consequences of negative externalities acts, on average, more environmentally friendly
than a property rights owner who causes such negative externality. Similarly, when it comes to the distribution
of income, the property rights owners who cause negative externalities allocate on average a larger share of the
income to themselves.

1. Introduction
One of the concerns in environmental and ecological economics is
the overexploitation of natural resources, especially in conjunction with
negative externalities. One example of such negative externalities due
to resource extraction is the use of fracking in the gas extraction industry (Hawkins, 2015). Some key problems are the negative impact of
fracking on water quality, air quality, and seismic activity. Another
example, more pertinent to the context of the current study, is downstream water pollution due to high-intensity farming practices upstream. A study of the Pomahaka River in Australia by Harding et al.
(1999) shows that such high intensity farming indeed has signiﬁcant
eﬀects on downstream river health, in particular aﬀecting species
composition. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2017) in the
US states that “The National Water Quality Assessment shows that
agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution is the leading source of water
quality impacts on surveyed rivers and streams, the third largest source for
lakes, the second largest source of impairments to wetlands, and a major
contributor to contamination of surveyed estuaries and ground water.”
Policy solutions to these problems focus on internalizing costs to
reduce externalities and, following the tenets of the Coase Theorem
(Coase, 1960), moving away from common to individual property - i.e.
privatize the natural resource ownership, or change to government
ownership (e.g. state parks, national parks, protected areas). However,
Ostrom and Cox (2010) criticize that these approaches are often seen as
a panacea to common resource and pollution problems - real world
situations are vastly more complex and require tailored policy responses instead of such generalized policies.
⁎

Consider the case of pollution in Tuttle Creek Lake in Kansas, which
is a reservoir on the Big Blue River. The Big Blue River ﬂows through
areas in Nebraska and Kansas characterized by intense agricultural
production. It is unclear who owns the property right to water quality in
this context. Farm operators consider it their right to choose the agricultural production process on their land, irrespective of the consequences of those choices on water quality due to agricultural run-oﬀ.
Similarly, downstream water users consider it their right to enjoy clean
water for drinking or leisure activities, such as boating, ﬁshing, or
swimming, irrespective of the constraints this imposes on the upstream
agricultural producers. One way to deal with such an issue is for the
government to step in and impose a set of rules and regulations.
However, farm operators in the U.S. have traditionally resisted such
government interference and generally command-and-control approaches are less eﬃcient than more market-based approaches (e.g.,
Seskin et al., 1983; Spoﬀord Jr., 1984; Krupnick, 1986). Due to the
number of stakeholders involved, the transaction costs of negotiations
would likely be signiﬁcant and as such the Coase Theorem is unlikely to
oﬀer an eﬃcient approach either. Nonetheless, this raises the question
on what impact assigning clearly deﬁned property rights has if negotiation is not possible. In particular, we are interested in this paper to
determine if assigning property rights to one group of stakeholders (in
this context farm operators or downstream water user) will make a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms of environmental outcomes and income
distribution, compared to assigning it to the other group. Our results
support that assigning property rights to the polluter increases pollution, but only in speciﬁc situations, and favors the polluter in terms of
the income distribution.
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of entitlement subjects are statistically signiﬁcantly more cooperative
and trusting in a private property setting than a common property trust
game. Coleman (2016) derive a similar result using the design by Cox
et al. (2009) in Bulgaria - a post-communist country. While not exactly
a trust game in the sense of Berg et al. (1995), the paper by Cox et al.
(2017) bears enough similarities to be included in this section. It introduces a sequential move game to measure reciprocity by a second
mover in response to acts of commission or omission by a ﬁrst mover.
Their ﬁndings support that earning the endowment signiﬁcantly affected the behavior of the ﬁrst mover, but did not aﬀect second movers'
reciprocal response.
It is important to note that most of the authors mentioned above
deﬁne property rights as earned endowment, in contrast to an allocated
endowment. To the best of our knowledge, Cox et al. (2009), Cox and
Hall (2010), and Coleman (2016) are the ﬁrst authors that explicitly
test the impact of diﬀerent property rights regimes rather than earned
versus allocated endowment. In this paper, we further investigate this
issue. In contrast to their papers we do not have diﬀerent property right
regimes but focus on the impact of who owns the private property right.
Further, where Cox et al. (2009), Cox and Hall (2010), and Coleman
(2016) analyzed a context free trust game, we instead consider a contextualized negative externalities game that is based on a dictator game.
In particular, we investigate the diﬀerence in behavior if property right
owners play diﬀerent roles in society.
We argue that it is quite important to consider the roles of economic
agents, because in the real world people do not make choices in a context
free environment – their opinions, attitudes, and personality are mostly
formed by their environment and their roles therein and hence might have
a signiﬁcant impact on the choices they are making. This goes back to the
argument by Ostrom and Cox (2010) – we need to consider the speciﬁc
context for eﬀective policy design rather than try to develop (non-existing)
panaceas. This paper tests experimentally whether in an upstream-downstream water pollution problem without bargaining (i.e. cases in which the
Coase Theorem does not apply), the initial assignment of property rights
matters when it comes to the level of pollution chosen and the distribution
of income between property right owner and non-owner. This may provide further insights into where and how assigning property rights may
lead to desirable outcomes and thus helps address the concerns raised by
Ostrom and Cox (2010).
Ex-ante, it is unclear how far the role a person plays in society aﬀects
their pro-environmental behavior. In particular, we are interested in the
impact of the property rights belonging to a polluter compared to them
belonging to the victim of pollution, controlling for the income eﬀects
of the pollution decisions. Since environmental problems are more
salient to the latter, we hypothesize that these individuals will feel more
directly aﬀected by environmental degradation and perhaps are better
able to empathize with nature and fellow human beings and will act on
that empathy by protecting the environment, even at a personal cost.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
outline previous research and develop the testable hypotheses. In Section 3
we discuss the experimental design and procedures. In Section 4 we
analyze the results. In Section 5 we discuss the results and conclude.
2. Previous Research and Testable Hypotheses
When it comes to the experimental economics literature, the role of
property rights has been studied in three well-known games: dictator
games; (ultimatum) bargaining games; and trust games. Below we will
discuss each of these games.
In the context of the dictator game, Hoﬀman et al. (1994) ﬁnd that
having earned property rights (rather than them being allocated) signiﬁcantly reduces giving. This is further supported by Cherry (2001) and
Cherry et al. (2002), who demonstrate that dictators display self-interested
behavior in the vast majority of cases if entitlements are earned, but much
less so if entitlements are allocated. Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) further
analyze the impact of the receiver earning wealth through costly eﬀort.
Their results demonstrate that if the receiver earned the property right, the
dictator was sharing signiﬁcantly more. In general, the share of the overall
available endowment going to the dictator and the frequency of self-interested behavior is sensitive to the choice set available to the dictator. List
(2007) and Bardsley (2008) show that if an option to take away endowment from the non-dictator is introduced, giving is signiﬁcantly lower.
Cappelen et al. (2012) demonstrate that these results are independent of
whether the endowment is earned. Cox et al. (2016) formally explain this
as the choice set providing a moral reference point, which in turn aﬀects
the decision of acting generously.
Hoﬀman and Spitzer (1982) conduct a bargaining experiment in
which two subjects bargain over the distribution of payoﬀs. Most pairs
of subjects maximize joint proﬁts and close to 50 percent of them end
up splitting the payoﬀ equally. In a follow-up experiment (Hoﬀman and
Spitzer, 1985), control of the initial endowment was earned through a
contest, rather than through random allocation. The resulting split of
the endowment is substantially more biased toward the controller of the
endowment (divider). Hoﬀman et al. (1994) corroborate in an ultimatum bargaining game (UBG) that the divider oﬀers signiﬁcant less to
the recipient if the entitlement is earned, rather than allocated. Guth
and Tietz (1986) further show that when the role in the UBG is auctioned oﬀ, oﬀers to the recipient are signiﬁcantly lower. Gaechter and
Riedle (2005) highlight that it is not only the legal right to the property
that matters for bargaining outcomes, but also the moral right, earned
through superior performance on a trivia quiz. Subjects with more
moral rights to the pie receive a larger share.
In the standard trust game (Berg et al., 1995) subjects (trustors) are
provided with an endowment, part of which they can choose to “entrust” to another subject (trustee) for potentially increased (or decreased) return. Fahr and Irlenbush (2000) investigate the change in
behavior of trustors and trustees if the endowment is earned in a real
eﬀort task. Their results demonstrate that trustors invest more if the
trustee had earned the property rights and that the trustee returns more
money if the trustor had earned the property rights. Cox et al. (2009)
implement a further variation to this game in that they label the basic
game design given by Berg et al. (1995) as the private or common
property game. In this private property game, the subject starts with
owning the endowment (i.e. property) and may contribute part of it to
achieve a social beneﬁt. The common property game instead labels the
endowment as owned by society and the ﬁrst mover can take any
amount away from this endowment for private gain (and social loss).
Cox et al. (2009) ﬁnd that endowments that are introduced as common
property lead to slight, albeit statistically insigniﬁcant, increases in
cooperative and trusting behavior. Cox and Hall (2010) conduct the
same experiment, except that they increase the feeling of entitlement to
the endowment, by requiring subjects to complete a real eﬀort task to
earn the endowment before the start of the experiment. This reverses
the ordering of outcomes in Cox et al. (2009) - under stronger feelings

Hypothesis 1. Assigning property rights to the victim of pollution will
lead to lower levels of pollution than if the property rights are assigned
to the polluter.
Similarly, this paper investigates how far the role a person plays in
society aﬀects the income distribution. It stands to reason that a person
that has the property rights to a resource will allocate the largest share of
the income coming out of that resource to self. Ex-ante it is unclear,
however, in how far the role being played aﬀects the size of that share. We
conjecture that, similar to Hypothesis 1, those subjects that are typically
more exposed to negative consequences of the decisions of others, are
perhaps better able to empathize with fellow human beings and thus be
more inclined to share a larger portion of the income out of the resource.
Hypothesis 2. Assigning property rights to the victim of pollution will
lead to a more equal distribution of income than if the property rights
are assigned to the polluter.
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3. Experimental Design and Procedures

3.2. Experimental Procedure

3.1. Experimental Design

We used the software z-Tree (Fishbacher, 2007) to program and
administer the experiment at the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory at the University of Nebraska – Lincoln. Anonymity
was assured by using a 5-digit random number to track subjects' decisions and make payments. Before the start of the game, instructions (see
Appendix A) were read out loud to all participants, and any potential
questions were answered. To ensure that subjects fully understood the
game, participants had to pass a test before proceeding to the actual
game.
Subjects were recruited from the student and non-student population of Lincoln, NE, using emails, ﬂyers, word-of-mouth, and postings in
local stores. In total 432 subjects participated in the experiment. Close
to 75% of subjects had farmers in their family and about one third of
subjects grew up in a rural area. Many subjects were therefore quite
familiar with the context of the experiment. As discussed before, depending on the treatment, either the UF or DWU was holding the
property right, i.e. was the property right owner (PRO). To establish a
feeling of entitlement in the participants, the roles were assigned at the
beginning of the experiment based on a quiz on property rights (see
Appendix B for screenshots of the quiz). This was an important step to
increase external validity, because property rights in the agricultural
area have often been controlled for generations, generating a real
feeling of entitlement to make choices irrespective of any consequences
to other parties involved. Participants who scored in the top 50% on the
quiz earned the right to be a PRO. Subsequently the UFs and DWUs
were randomly paired and played for two rounds with the same
(anonymous) partner. At the end of the experiment, subjects answered
survey questions on demographic characteristics and personality scales.
Decisions by the participants were incentive compatible with tokens
exchanged at the end of the experiment at a rate of 75 tokens = $1,
with average cash earnings of $45 with a range of $15 to $71 for a
60–90 min session. The opportunity cost (average reported hourly
wage) was $9.73. Fifty-one percent of subjects were female. The subject
ages ranged from 19 to 85 years, with an average age of 29.

To test the hypotheses, we used a framed laboratory experiment
modeling a downstream water pollution situation with two players: an
Upstream Farmer (UF) and a Downstream Water User (DWU). The UF is
an agricultural operator who has 500 acres of farming land upstream.
The DWU is an individual who gets drinking water and uses water for
recreational purposes from the river or the lake downstream. Both UF
and DWU can be the property rights owner (PRO). The PRO owns the
rights to the downstream water and thus can decide how much land out
of 500 acres will be placed under Conservation Tillage (CT), with the
corresponding pollution. CT is a relatively less harmful tilling practice
as compared to intensive tillage due to land being disturbed minimally.
CT leads to lower chemical runoﬀ, less soil erosion and, as a result,
higher drinking water quality in the rivers and lakes downstream. At
the same time, CT is perceived1 as a costlier farming practice than intensive tillage due to less certainty regarding planting dates and higher
risks. The payoﬀ of the DWU is therefore aﬀected by the choice of CT by
the PRO. The party who does not own property rights (this can be either
the UF or the DWU) is called the Non-owner of Property Rights (NPRO).
The game consists of three stages (Fig. 1). During Stage 1, the PRO
decides how much of farming land will be placed under CT. The rest of
the land is assumed to be under intensive tillage. Property right ownership is a treatment variable – in some treatments the UF is the PRO,
arguably perceived as the standard case of our social and economic
reality, in others the DWU is the PRO. Depending on the chosen CT, the
UF and DWU get diﬀerent initial payoﬀs (Table 1). Note that the socially optimal (yielding the highest total payoﬀ for both players) level
of CT is 300, while the lowest level of water pollution will occur when
CT = 500. This implies an inherent tradeoﬀ between economic (the
individual and group proﬁt) and environmental considerations.
During Stage 2 the property right owner may choose to transfer
some portion of the DWU's payoﬀ to the UF as compensation for any
reduction in payoﬀ to the UF due to CT above 0. This captures the
reality of farm operators receiving explicit and implicit subsidies from
the government for environmentally friendly choices. In addition, it
allows us to separate the environmental decision from the decision on
monetary payoﬀ. The maximum amount that can be transferred depends on the relative payoﬀs of the two players, but after the transfer
the payoﬀ to the DWU cannot be below 300 tokens. The payoﬀ can be
transferred only one way – from the DWU to the UF. After the transfer,
the ﬁnal payoﬀs are calculated.
During Stage 3 the chosen level of CT, the transfer, and the ﬁnal
payoﬀs are displayed to both players. In the “No feedback” conditions the
game ends here. The game thus resembles a standard dictator game
(Kahneman et al., 1986) in which one player makes all the choices and the
other player only sees the results of the decisions. In the “feedback” conditions, Stage 3 allows NPRO to provide feedback on the decisions made
by the property right owner. This feedback can take on the form of a
ﬁnancial ﬁne (called “Imposing Fine”) or appealing to empathy (called
“Emotional Feedback”) through the sending of a frowney face ☹ (Fig.2).
Providing feedback is costly for the NPRO. Imposing a ﬁne costs 1
token for each 5 tokens of ﬁne imposed. Sending a frowney face costs
50 tokens.2 The ﬁne/frowney can be applied to the choice of level of CT
and/or the choice of transfer. The combination of 2 PRO assignments
and 3 feedback types produced 6 experimental conditions (Table 2).

3.3. Experimental Hypotheses Revisited
Based on the experimental design we test Hypothesis 1 using the
choice of CT as the relevant parameter. From an environmental perspective, it is unambiguously clear that a choice of CT = 500 is the
optimal choice – all land would be farmed using CT. Ex-ante, it is unclear whether being a DWU or a UF aﬀects this choice. The key difference between the roles is that the DWU does experience the eﬀect of
pollution and irrespective of what happens to the total payoﬀ, the
pollution is there to stay. As such, the DWU may feel more directly
aﬀected by environmental degradation and perhaps is better able to
empathize with nature and fellow human beings.
Hypothesis 1. (reformulated): DWU as PRO puts more acres under CT
than UF as PRO.
Hypothesis 2 states that the share of income that is allocated to self
is lower for individuals who are experiencing negative consequences. In
the framework of this experiment, the Nash equilibrium choice is to
maximize the amount given to oneself. There is no ﬁnancial or strategic
incentive to give any more tokens to the other player. Nonetheless,
experimental evidence shows that dictators do not always choose this
payoﬀ-maximizing outcome (see for example Forsythe et al., 1994). For
this study, it is of secondary importance whether the dictator gives nonzero amounts to the receiver. Instead we are interested in the impact of
who owns the property rights, and as such the comparison of the behavior of dictators in diﬀerent treatments. We conjecture that, as
mentioned for Hypothesis 1 (reformulated), playing the role of the
DWU as PRO, allows subjects to put themselves better in the shoes of
someone being aﬀected by other people's choices, and suﬀering perhaps

1
The reality is that conservation tillage typically is overall increasing proﬁts.
Nonetheless, the perception is often diﬀerent from reality.
2
The cost of 50 tokens was chosen based on the experiment conducted by Czap et al.
(2013). In their paper this cost led to 56%–60% of subjects choosing to send a frowney,
which is desirable from a statistical standpoint – i.e. we would like to have a variety of
observed behavior. This number is also in line with the frequency with which subjects
chose to impose monetary rewards and punishment in Andreoni et al. (2003).
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Determines pollution & welfare distribution

Fine

Emotional Feedback

1. PRO chooses CT
2. PRO chooses transfer from
DWU to UF

3. NPRO sends emotional feedback
or fine to PRO
Fig. 1. Stages of a round.

As one would expect, UFs choose a larger number at the lower end
of CT than the DWUs and DWUs choose more on the upper tail of the
distribution. The distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each
other (p-value < 0.0001 for Fisher's Exact Test).
We further calculate the share of total available payoﬀ that is allocated by PRO to themselves. We use the share instead of absolute
payoﬀ, because the pie to be shared by PRO and NPRO depends on the
choice of CT. As such, the absolute payoﬀ is not the appropriate (independent) statistic to look at when trying to determine the impact of
property right ownership on wealth distribution. As evident from Fig. 6,
the diﬀerence between the UF as PRO and the DWU as PRO is approximately ten percentage points, or, expressed diﬀerently, the UF
gives 20% more to self than the DWU. This diﬀerence is economically
and statistically signiﬁcant (p-value < 0.0001 for the Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon test).
We again break this down by treatment and calculate 90% conﬁdence intervals based on a bootstrap with 1000 resamples (Fig. 7).
The results show that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
UF as PRO and the DWU as PRO across treatments of similar type, i.e.
the UF as PRO without feedback gives signiﬁcantly more to self than the
DWU as PRO without feedback, the UF as PRO in the emotional feedback treatment gives signiﬁcantly more to self than the DWU as PRO in
the emotional feedback treatment, and, lastly, the UF as PRO in the
ﬁning treatment gives signiﬁcantly more to self than DWU as PRO in
the ﬁning treatment.
The distribution of total payoﬀs (Fig. 8) is again expressed using the
proportion of DWUs and UFs, respectively, that choose a share of total
payoﬀ in the various ranges. The distribution reveals that DWU as PRO
and UF as PRO are by far the most likely to choose a share of between
45% and 55% (most of them are at 50%). A few DWU as PRO are
willing to end up with < 45%, but more choose to allocate a much
larger share, up to 85% to self. For the UF as PRO the picture is quite
diﬀerent. A fairly large percentage of UF as PRO, > 20%, choose to
maximize own proﬁts and end up in the 85–95% range.
To control for additional variables and shed some more light on
what is driving these results we run several regressions. The ﬁrst set of
regressions is on the choice of CT (Table 3). We account for the truncated choice set by running a Tobit regression (truncated between 0 and
500). Model 1 includes the dummy for UF is PRO as our main variable
of interest and controls for the additional treatment eﬀects of inducing
empathy via providing emotional feedback or imposing a ﬁne.5 It is
possible that the potential of being punished either with a frowney or a
monetary ﬁne will alter the behavior when choosing CT. To account for
this possibility, we run a regression (Model 2) without any feedback
treatments (i.e. only roughly 1/3 of the data set). Interestingly, the
result shows that without the threat of punishment who owns the
property rights has no statistically signiﬁcant impact on the choice of

Table 1
Initial payoﬀ distribution.
Level of CT out
of 500

UF's payoﬀ,
tokens

DWU's payoﬀ,
tokens

Total payoﬀ (not
displayed to players)

0
100
200
300
400
500

1500
1300
1100
900
700
500

300
700
1100
1500
1600
1700

1800
2000
2200
2400
2300
2200

negative consequences. This may allow for increased empathy and
hence additional sharing of payoﬀs. Our second hypothesis is thus:
Hypothesis 2. (reformulated): The share3 of total payoﬀ that is
allocated to self is higher if the UF is PRO than if the DWU is PRO.
4. Experimental Results
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of property rights
in environmental decisions and choices regarding the distribution of
income. Because, depending on the treatment, subjects may receive
feedback on their actions in the ﬁrst round, which may aﬀect their
behavior in the second round, we limit our analysis to the ﬁrst round.4
The descriptive statistics show that who owns the property right
matters for the choice of CT (Fig. 3). Across all treatments, the DWU
allocates on average more land (342 acres) to CT than the UF does
(317 acres) as PRO (p-value = 0.0683 for the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
test). It is important to note that the DWU as well as the UF choose on
average an allocation of CT acres that is above the total payoﬀ maximizing allocation of CT = 300 (p-value < 0.05 for the UF is PRO),
suggesting environmental considerations.
The overall picture is somewhat less clear when we consider each
treatment separately. The dots in Fig. 4 show the average choice of CT
by treatment and the line indicates the 90% conﬁdence interval based
on a bootstrap procedure with 1000 resamples.
We can see from Fig. 4 that the behavior of DWU is relatively
consistent across treatments, whereas the choices of the UF vary a lot.
However, based on the 90% conﬁdence intervals none of the diﬀerences
are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other.
The distribution of choices (Fig. 5) is expressed as a percentage of the
total number of UFs and DWUs respective, because of the unequal number
of observations for the diﬀerent treatments. It shows that the choice of
CT = 300 is by far the most common choice for UF and DWU as PRO.
3
We use percentage here, because the total payoﬀ that is potentially allocated to self
depends on the choice of CT and the role played.
4
The analysis of the reaction to feedback goes beyond what this paper sets out to do
and is therefore excluded from the discussion apart from the analysis of its inﬂuence on
pre-feedback decisions.

5
Note that all data are from the ﬁrst round so no punishment has been imposed before
choices are made.
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Fig. 2. The z-Tree screenshot: an example of appealing to empathy via emotional feedback sent by DWU to UF.
Table 2
Number of participants in each experimental condition.

342

345

Type of feedback

UF is PRO
DWU is PRO

No feedback

Imposing Fine

Emotional Feedback

40
40

80
96

80
96

330

317
315

CT.
Model 3 diﬀers from Model 1 in that it interacts the feedback conditions with the dummy for UF as PRO. The results show that the impact of the ownership of property rights is situation dependent. In situations in which punishment is possible the UF as PRO chooses a level
of CT that is much lower than in situations without feedback. While it
was expected that the UF as PRO will allocate less acreage to CT than
the DWU as PRO, it is rather surprising that this is only the case for the
feedback treatments. If anything, one would expect the opposite. As a
last robustness check on our results we ran a regression (Model 4) that
included dummy variables for all treatments (DWU no feedback is the
baseline), which further supports the results from Model 2 and Model 3.
Given that the maximum choice of acreage to put under CT is 500, a
diﬀerence of between 50 and 67 acres under the feedback treatments is
not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also economically quite substantial. Hypothesis 1 is therefore partially supported.
The second set of regressions (Table 4) is on the share of the payoﬀ
going to the PRO. The choice set is, again, truncated and as such would
call for a Tobit regression. Instead, we opted for running a linear regression with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors for two
reasons: (1) the Breusch-Pagan test indicates heteroscedasticity in the
data and there is no good way to adjust for this when running a Tobit
regression, and (2) the truncation of the choice of the share of payoﬀ
going to the PRO depends on the role the subject is playing and the
choice of CT and as such there are no clear truncation parameters for
estimation. Ex-ante it is unclear how far the choice of CT matters for the
subsequent choice of the share of payoﬀ going to the PRO. We therefore
run one “share of payoﬀ going to PRO” regression with CT and one
without CT to check for robustness of the results. The regression with
CT also contains an interaction term of CT and the dummy for the UF

300
UF is PRO

DWU is PRO

Fig. 3. Conservation Tillage depending on who owns the property rights.

being a PRO. This interaction term is included, because a higher choice
of CT means diﬀerent (opposite) things for the UF and DWU: for the UF
an increase in CT leads to a decrease in pre-transfer proﬁts, whereas for
the DWU an increase in CT leads to an increase in pre-transfer proﬁts. In
addition to “UF is PRO”, the principal variable of interest, we include
dummy variables for the feedback conditions (i.e. Imposing Fine or
Emotinal Feedback inducing empathy).
Similar to the regression on CT (Models 1–4), we also investigate
how far the results are robust to variations in the treatment of the
feedback/ﬁne conditions. Model 7 removes all data from the feedback/
ﬁne conditions, whereas Model 8 interacts the feedback/ﬁne with the
dummy for UF as PRO. In addition, to be consistent with our analysis in
Model 4 (Table 3), we also run a regression (Model 9 in Table 5) with
dummies for all treatments and DWU as PRO without feedback/ﬁne as
the baseline case.
The results consistently show that who owns the property right is
statistically and economically highly signiﬁcant when it comes to the
distribution of income. Compared to the DWU as the property right
owner, the UF allocates almost 10 percentage points more to self, based
on the regression without CT. The regression with CT is a bit harder to
interpret, as it includes the interaction term. Since the UF on average
chooses a CT of about 340, the net impact of being a UF is consistent
with the results from the regression without CT for the average UF. The
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Fig. 4. 90% conﬁdence interval for CT by treatment.

0.7

Proporon of UF as PRO

Proporon of DWU as PRO

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

100

200

300

400

500
CT in acres

Fig. 5. Distribution of CT choices by property right owner (proportion of UF or DWU who are PRO).

0.65

Interestingly, in Model 7 the interaction term between UF as PRO and
CT is positive, which implies, contrary to the other models, that a
higher choice of CT leads to an increase in the share of payoﬀ going to
the PRO. Models 8–9 further corroborate the results from Model 6.
Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported.

0.64

0.60

5. Discussion and Conclusion

0.54

0.55

In light of the proposed signiﬁcant budget cuts to many federal
agencies, in particular the Environmental Protection Agency,7 coupled
with signiﬁcant environmental challenges, it is paramount for policy
makers to develop cheaper policy alternatives to achieve environmental
and social objectives. The current policy paradigm, which is focused on
market incentives or top-down regulation, comes with signiﬁcant costs.
Alternative approaches derived from experimental and behavioral research may replace or augment these more traditional approaches at
signiﬁcantly lower costs. In this paper we simplify a complex real world
multi-person interaction with non-point source pollution as a negative
externality to an experimental situation with only two parties involved,
an upstream farmer who potentially causes pollution and a downstream

0.50
UF is PRO

DWU is PRO

Fig. 6. Share of total payoﬀ that was allocated to the property rights owner.

UFs that chose a lower CT end up giving a higher share of the overall
pie to themselves.6 Excluding the feedback conditions from our analysis
(Model 7) only further increases the share of payoﬀ going to the PRO.

6
Note: whether UF or DWU is the PRO, the PRO will get a larger share of income.
However, the UF as a PRO will get a larger share of the pie than the DWU would as a PRO.

7
As of the writing of this article (September 2017), the proposed budget cuts to the
EPA amounted to $2.6 billion, roughly 1/3 of its prior budget.
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Fig. 7. 90% conﬁdence interval for the share of total payoﬀ by treatment.
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Fig. 8. Distribution of share of total payoﬀs allocated to the property rights owner.
Table 4
The eﬀect of property rights ownership on the share of payoﬀ allocated to self.

Table 3
Eﬀect of property rights ownership on the choice of CT.
Variable Name

Intercept
UF is PRO (Yes = 1)
UF is PRO & no Feedback
(Yes = 1)
UF is PRO & Emot Feedback
(Yes = 1)
UF is PRO & Imposing Fine
(Yes = 1)
DWU is PRO & Emot Feedback
(Yes = 1)
DWU is PRO & Imposing Fine
(Yes = 1)
Control Variables:
Emotional Feedback (Yes = 1)
Imposing Fine (Yes = 1)
Emotional Feedback × UF is
PRO
Imposing Fine × UF is PRO

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

All data

Subset

All data

All data

384.14⁎⁎⁎
−29.7⁎⁎
–

371.89⁎⁎⁎
–
6.7

350.98⁎⁎⁎
22.01
–

365.14⁎⁎⁎
–
7.82

–

–

–

−59.24⁎⁎

–

–

–

−50.85

–

–

–

−6.95

–

–

–

−27

Variable Name

Intercept
CT
UF is PRO (Yes = 1)
CT × UF is PRO (Yes = 1)
Control Variables:
Emotional Feedback
(Yes = 1)
Imposing Fine (Yes = 1)
Emotional Feedback × UF is
PRO
Imposing Fine × UF is PRO

⁎

⁎

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

All data

All data

Subset

All data

0.5379⁎⁎⁎
–
0.099⁎⁎⁎
–

0.3387⁎⁎⁎
0.0006⁎⁎⁎
0.4291⁎⁎⁎
−0.001⁎⁎⁎

0.2464⁎⁎
0.0008⁎⁎⁎
0.5902⁎⁎⁎
0.0014⁎⁎⁎

0.3259⁎⁎⁎
0.0006⁎⁎⁎
0.4615⁎⁎⁎
−0.001⁎⁎⁎

0.0243⁎

0.0138

–

–

−0.0252
–

−0.0296
–

–
–

–
−0.001

–

–

–

−0.0514

⁎⁎⁎
⁎

−36.26
−43.29⁎⁎
–

–
–
–

–
–
−67.08⁎⁎

–
–
–

–

–

−58.69⁎⁎

–

⁎⁎
⁎

Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Signiﬁcant at 5%.
Signiﬁcant at 10%.

water user who suﬀers the consequences of said pollution. In this
context, we ask the question: does it matter, who owns the property
rights (farm operator or water user) for environmental choices and
income distribution?
This paper adds to the agricultural and environmental literature on

⁎⁎⁎
⁎⁎

Model 5

Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Signiﬁcant at 5%.
Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Having the DWU as PRO will result in a more egalitarian income
distribution. The DWU as PRO will on average still allocate more income to self than to other, but to a lesser degree than if the UF is PRO.
This result holds in all conditions (with and without the threat of a ﬁne/
emotional feedback). One explanation for why the threat of a ﬁne/
emotional feedback makes no diﬀerence in the income distribution
choice (whereas it does for the pro-environmental choice) is based on
the sequence of play in the experiment. As discussed above, subjects
may take the potential for punishment into consideration when making
their choice for CT. Once the CT is chosen, there is no further impact of
the threat of punishment on the income distribution, because CT is
controlled for.
Our results thus conﬁrm that “might makes right”, but to varying
degrees, depending on the role played. Singer and Fehr (2005) conjecture that the ability to empathize will potentially reduce self-interested choices. This is supported in Czap et al. (2013), who demonstrate
that being able to walk-in-the-shoes of others signiﬁcantly increases
altruistic behavior. We speculate that playing the role of a DWU in an
upstream-downstream pollution game enables players to walk-in-theshoes of others and therefore, as argued by the metaeconomics and dual
interest theory (Lynne et al., 2016), temper their self-interest. This result is irrespective of the degree of empathy in the subjects, which was
found to be statistically insigniﬁcant. We can therefore speculate, that
being in the position of a person experiencing the (negative) consequences of other people's behavior allows a person to be more empathetic and walk-in-the-shoes of another person in this particular
context, but not necessarily be a more empathetic person.
The main implication for policy makers is that we cannot achieve
more pro-environmental choices by reassigning property rights without
also having a system of feedback or punishment in place for the upstream polluter. The good news is that all it takes is to enable aﬀected
downstream water users to express their disapproval to achieve similar
results than with a system of monetary ﬁnes in place. We ﬁnd that the
victim of pollution does not make pro-environmental choices solely to
beneﬁt him/herself monetarily, but also for the sake of the environment
itself. Another policy implication is that, if a more egalitarian income
distribution is the desired outcome, policy makers can assign property
rights to those parts of society that usually are at the receiving end of
negative externalities. Rather than seek retribution, or behave symmetrically to what they might typically experience, these people may
actually feel more empathy to their fellow human beings and as such
achieve a more equal distribution of income without further costly
regulation.

Table 5
The eﬀect of property rights ownership on the share of payoﬀ allocated to self
with dummies for each treatment.
Variable Name

Model 9

Intercept
CT
CT × (UF is PRO & no Feedback)
CT × (UF is PRO & Emotional Feedback)
CT × (UF is PRO & Imposing Fine)
UF is PRO & no Feedback (Yes = 1)
UF is PRO & Emotional Feedback (Yes = 1)
UF is PRO & Imposing Fine (Yes = 1)
DWU is PRO & Emotional Feedback (Yes = 1)
DWU is PRO & Imposing Fine (Yes = 1)

0.323⁎⁎⁎
0.0006⁎⁎⁎
−0.0012⁎⁎⁎
−0.001⁎⁎⁎
−0.001⁎⁎⁎
0.5136⁎⁎⁎
0.45⁎⁎⁎
0.4076⁎⁎⁎
0.0274
−0.0097

⁎⁎⁎

Signiﬁcant at 1%.

negative externalities and the experimental literature on the role of
property rights. Our results show that subjects care for the environment. Choices by the UF as PRO above CT = 300 indicate environmental concern. For the DWU as PRO such a choice could be due to the
desire to increase own payoﬀ. However, of all the choices of CT by the
DWU as PRO that are above the payoﬀ maximizing choice of CT = 300,
75% show a subsequent substantial transfer (428 tokens) to the UF,
clearly not a proﬁt maximizing behavior. As such, the initial choice to
pick a higher CT strongly indicates environmental considerations at
play. More importantly for this paper, we ﬁnd that without bargaining
the impact of the initial assignment of property rights on environmental
as well as distributional outcomes depends on the presence of ﬁnes/
emotional feedback. In the treatments without ﬁnes/emotional feedback the allocation of property rights has no impact on the environmental outcome. This is an interesting result as it is consistent with the
prediction of the Coase Theorem, but without negotiation! On the other
hand, if there is a threat of a ﬁne/emotional feedback, giving the
property right to the polluter will lead to worse environmental outcomes (lower CT). This result is somewhat surprising, because with a
potential ﬁne/emotional feedback one would rather expect better environmental outcomes (higher CT) instead of worse outcomes. One
possible explanation is that potential punishment made subjects feel
more compelled to reach the maximum total payoﬀ by choosing
CT = 300 and as such they decided against a more environmentally
friendly outcome (choosing CT higher than 300 acres). Another possible
explanation is based on the revealed altruism theory (Cox et al., 2008),
which was further investigated in Cox et al. (2017). Cox et al. (2017)
show that acts of commission illicit more negative reciprocity than acts
of omission. If UFs as PRO had a target ﬁnal payoﬀ for themselves in
mind when making the choice of CT, a larger choice of CT would ceteris
paribus require a larger subsequent transfer. Based on Cox et al. (2017)
this would likely be seen quite unfavorably and increase the chance of
punishment. As such, subjects might have been inclined to avoid that
situation. One problem with this explanation is that there really is no
total payoﬀ maximizing reason for choosing a CT > 300. Future research is needed to investigate this phenomenon in more detail.
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Appendix A. Instructions
Below is an example of the instructions handed out to subjects. There were 6 versions of instructions, one for each treatment. The main diﬀerence
was in who is the PRO and therefore makes the decision in Stage 1 and Stage 2, and whether there was a stage 4.
Summary of Instructions
Basics:

• Game will be played for 2 rounds with the same person
• Exchange rate $1 = 75 tokens
• Your cash earnings will be paid to you privately and will consist of two parts:
o the sum of the game payoﬀs in 2 rounds
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o $15 base pay

• Your decisions are conﬁdential and anonymous
• Communication with another participant during the experiment is not allowed
Each of the two rounds will go through the following stages.
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer's decision on Conservation Tillage
Upstream Farmer decides how much of the farming land (out of 500 acres) will be placed under Conservation Tillage (CT), which results in the
following payoﬀs:

Level of CT, acres of land

Payoﬀ of UF, tokens

Payoﬀ of DWU, tokens

0
100
200
300
400
500

1500
1300
1100
900
700
500

300
700
1100
1500
1600
1700

Stage 2: Transfer of payoﬀs by the Upstream Farmer
Upstream Farmer may choose to transfer some portion of payoﬀ from Downstream Water User to self. The payoﬀ of Downstream Water User after
the transfer cannot be below 300 tokens. The payoﬀs can be transferred only ONE way – from DWU to UF.
Stage 3: Downstream Water User's response:
Downstream Water User will be given information about:
(1) Level of Conservation Tillage determined by Upstream Farmer
(2) The transfer from DWU to UF and the resulting payoﬀs of UF and DWU
Downstream Water User can express 0, 1, 2 frowneys ☹ to Upstream Farmer for: their choice of level of CT, for the transfer and resulting payoﬀs,
or for both. Expressing each ☹ costs 50 tokens.
Stage 4: Application of feedback:
If 1 or 2 frowneys ☹ have been expressed, Upstream Farmer will be shown ☹ or ☹☹ respectively.
Appendix B. Quiz to Determine the PRO
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Appendix B (continued)
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Appendix B (continued)
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